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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PRIVACY AND EQUAL PROTECTION-
ARKANSAS JOINS OTHER STATES IN A REVIVAL OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS
AS GUARDIANS OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, ESTABLISHING NEW PROTECTIONS
FOR ARKANSAS GAYS AND LESBIANS. Jegley v. Picado, 349 Ark. 600, 80
S.W.3d 332 (2002).
I. INTRODUCTION
In Jegley v. Picado,1 an eloquent opinion by Justice Annabelle Imber
declared that civil liberties are alive and well in Arkansas.2 Unprecedented
in its articulation of privacy rights under the Arkansas Constitution,3 the
decision also enhances the state's commitment to equal protection.4 With an
expansive interpretation of justiciability, the Picado resolution provides
assurances that Arkansans in legal distress will get their day in court.5 The
Arkansas Supreme Court, holding that the Arkansas Constitution grants
individual rights greater than those under the United States Constitution,
may be coming into its own as a guardian of civil liberties.6
In Picado, the court took on a politically and socially sensitive issue-
the constitutionality of the state statute criminalizing sexual intimacy be-
tween persons of the same sex, also known as the "sodomy law.",7 After
three unsuccessful attempts to persuade the Arkansas General Assembly to
repeal the statute,8 gay rights activists looked to the courts for relief from
1. 349 Ark. 600, 80 S.W.3d 332 (2002).
2. See id. at 632, 80 S.W.3d at 350. In asserting that due process is a living principle,
the court quoted Justice Frankfurter in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949), overruled
by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), in which he stated that:
[i]t is of the very nature of a free society to advance in its standards of what is
deemed reasonable and right. Representing as it does a living principle, due
process is not confined within a permanent catalogue of what may at a given
time be deemed the limits or the essentials of fundamental rights.
Picado, 349 Ark. at 632, 80 S.W.3d at 350.
3. See Picado, 349 Ark. at 632, 80 S.W.3d at 350. In Picado, the Arkansas Supreme
Court acknowledged a fundamental right to privacy under the Arkansas Constitution, subject
to strict scrutiny review. See id., 80 S.W.3d at 350. For a discussion of levels of constitu-
tional review, see infra Part III.B. 1 .b.
4. See Picado, 349 Ark. at 637-38, 80 S.W.3d at 353-54.
5. See id. at 611-22, 80 S.W.3d at 336-43; see discussions infra Parts IV.A, V.B.
6. See Picado, 349 Ark. at 611-22, 80 S.W.3d at 336-43. The court had previously
"recognized protection of individual rights greater than the federal floor" only in search and
seizure cases. Id. at 631, 80 S.W.3d at 349. See infra Part III.A.2 for a discussion of the
Arkansas Supreme Court's use of the state constitution in the protection of civil rights.
7. See Picado, 349 Ark. at 632, 80 S.W.3d at 350.
8. S.B. 378, 80th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 1995); S.B. 565, 79th Gen. Assem.,
Reg. Sess. (Ark. 1993); S.B. 125, 78th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 1991). None of these
bills survived the General Assembly's Judiciary Committee. Picado, 349 Ark. at 621, 80
S.W.3d at 342-43. Congressman Vic Snyder sponsored the three attempts at repeal of the
sodomy law when he was an Arkansas State Senator because "it was a transparently dis-
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what the Picado court acknowledged as a legal "Catch-22." 9 The state re-
fused to disavow the law, but also declined to prosecute anyone under it,
thus insulating the statute from judicial review. 10 Meanwhile, lesbian and
gay citizens were forced to choose between celibacy and criminality. 1 The
Picado plaintiffs12 also alleged that the statute caused collateral harms in-
cluding fear of prosecution and a multitude of social and legal ramifica-
tions.' 3 The Arkansas Supreme Court responded to this plight by agreeing to
hear the case, holding that private, consensual, noncommercial intimacy
between adults of the same sex is protected by the Arkansas Constitution,
14
and acknowledging homosexuals as a separate and identifiable class entitled
to constitutional protection.15
This note begins with a brief review of the facts and procedural posture
of Picado, including a glimpse into the lives of the seven lesbian and gay
Arkansans who brought the suit.' 6 It puts the case into national and histori-
cal context by examining the United States Supreme Court and the high
courts of the states in their roles as protectors of civil liberties. 17 The author
then narrows this exploration with a look at the legal status of lesbians and
gay men at the national and state levels, with a particular focus on Arkansas.
The note ends with a walk-through of the reasoning used in Picado8 and a
discussion of the significance of the Picado decision, especially the implica-
tions of its recognition of a fundamental right to privacy for all citizens and
equal protection for gays and lesbians.' 9
II. FACTS
In 1998 Elena Picado was the mother of two children, a Spanish
teacher at a Little Rock high school, and a member of Spirit Song Metro-
criminatory part of our criminal code which served no purpose." Interview via email with
Vic Snyder, United States Congress (Nov. 12, 2002). According to Congressman Snyder, the
effort to repeal the statute included testimony by compelling witnesses such as State Senator
Mike Everett, who described his experience as the father of a young, gay man. Id. Although
the statute was not repealed, the process helped to educate state officials and the public about
the discriminatory nature of the law. Id.
9. Picado, 349 Ark. at 622, 80 S.W.3d at 343.
10. Id., 80 S.W.3d at 343.
11. Id., 80 S.W.3d at 343.
12. See infra note 24 for a brief description of each of the seven plaintiffs and note 26
for a look at plaintiff Elena Picado's motivation for joining the suit.
13. Some of the collateral harms alleged by the plaintiffs are described infra in note 34.
14. Picado, 349 Ark. at 632, 80 S.W.3d at 350.
15. Id. at 634, 80 S.W.3d at 351.
16. See infra Part II.
17. See infra Part IIl.A.
18. See infra Part IV.
19. See infra Part V.
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politan Community Church.2° She enjoyed working with stained glass,
cooking, and gardening.21 She lived in the country with her children, her
partner, four dogs, and a guinea pig.22 As a lesbian in a long-term, physi-
cally intimate relationship with another woman, Picado was also a criminal
under Arkansas law.23
On January 28, 1998, Picado, six other Arkansas gays and lesbians,24
and their attorneys announced that they were filing a lawsuit asking the
court to declare Arkansas's criminal sodomy law25 unconstitutional. 26 The
plaintiffs also sought an injunction against enforcement of the statute, as-
serting that they had violated the statute in the past, intended to violate it in
the future, and had a fear of prosecution.27 They based their complaint on
alleged violations of rights to privacy and equal protection under the United
States Constitution and the Arkansas Constitution. 28 Specifically, the plain-
20. Telephone Interview with Elena Picado (Oct. 6, 2002).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Affidavit of Elena Picado at 1-2, Jegley v. Picado, 349 Ark. 600, 80 S.W.3d 332
(2002) (No. 01-815). Elena Picado admitted committing acts described as sodomy and made
criminal under ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-122 (Michie Repl. 1997). Affidavit of Elena Picado
at 1-2, Picado (No. 0 1-815).
24. The other plaintiffs were: Vernon Stokay, an inspector at a computer manufacturing
plant from Little Rock; George Townsand, a registered nurse from Sherwood; Charlotte
Downey, the owner and operator of a bait and tackle shop near Eureka Springs; Randy
McCain, the pastor of the Open Door Community Church in Sherwood; Robin White, a
research analyst at a Little Rock software development company; and Bryan Manire, a pro-
fessional counselor in the Fayetteville public school district. Affidavits of Vernon Stokay,
George Townsand, Charlotte Downey, Randy McCain, Robin White, and Bryan Manire,
Picado, (No. 01-815).
25. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-122. The statute prohibited:
any act of sexual gratification involving: (1) [t]he penetration, however slight, of
the anus or mouth of ... a person by the penis of a person of the same sex... ;
or (2) [t]he penetration, however slight, of the vagina or anus of ... a person by
any body member of a person of the same sex ....
Id. The criminal penalty for a conviction was up to one year in jail and/or a fine of up to
$1000. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-4-201, -401 (Michie Repl. 1997).
26. Press Release, Lambda Legal, Lambda, Arkansas Activists To Announce Challenge
to State Sodomy Ban (Jan. 28, 1998), available at http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-
bin/iowa/documents/record?record=177 [hereinafter Press Release]. Picado's participation in
the suit was motivated by fear of prosecution and her concern for gay and lesbian youth.
Telephone Interview with Elena Picado, supra note 20. She believed the sodomy law was
both a threat and a condemnation clouding the lives of Arkansas homosexuals. Id. "If there
was a statute saying any child with black blood would be born a slave," explained Picado,
"any mother would get out and destroy that law. It may be that it would not be used, but as
long as it is on the law books, it could be used. 'May' is not good enough." Id.
27. Bryant v. Picado, 338 Ark. 227, 230, 996 S.W.2d 17, 18 (1999).
28. Id., 996 S.W.2d at 18. The plaintiffs claimed privacy rights under the Bill of Rights
and privacy and equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution and article 2 of the Arkansas Constitution. Id., 996 S.W.2d at 18.
2003]
UALR LAW REVIEW
tiffs argued that criminalizing their private, consensual sexual acts was a
violation of their privacy rights. 29 They also claimed that criminalizing con-
duct between homosexuals that is legal between heterosexuals violated the
plaintiffs' rights to equal protection.3°
Defendants Attorney General Winston Bryant and Sixth Judicial Dis-
trict Prosecuting Attorney Larry Jegley
31 unsuccessfully moved to dismiss. 32
Their primary argument was that the case was not justiciable because none
of the plaintiffs had been charged with a violation of the statute and there
was no realistic threat of enforcement.33 The plaintiffs countered that the
case was justiciable because the statute created a credible threat of prosecu-
tion and the unequal treatment supported by the statute caused judicially
cognizable injuries by institutionalizing and condoning discrimination
against lesbian and gay citizens. 34 Although the defendants denied any in-
tention to prosecute under the sodomy statute, the plaintiffs argued that ho-
mosexuals had every reason to believe the state was committed to the law
and would enforce it.35 They pointed out that bills to repeal the law were
29. Id., 996 S.W.2d at 18.
30. Id., 996 S.W.2d at 18.
31. Jegley v. Picado, 349 Ark. 600, 609, 80 S.W.3d 332, 335 (2002). Mark Pryor re-
placed Winston Bryant as Attorney General of Arkansas in January 1999. Id., 80 S.W.3d at
335. He was substituted for Bryant, but the circuit court subsequently agreed with Pryor's
contention that he had no nexus with the enforcement of the sodomy statute and granted his
motion to dismiss. Id., 80 S.W.3d at 335. In June 2000 the circuit court certified Jegley as
representative of a defendant class consisting of all state prosecuting attorneys. Id., 80
S.W.3d at 335.
32. Id., 80 S.W.3d at 335.
33. Picado v. Jegley, CV 99-7048 (6th Div. Pulaski County Cir. Ct. Mar. 23, 2001).
34. Id. The plaintiffs offered evidence of a variety of harms collateral to the criminal
sodomy statute. Id. Picado described her fear of losing custody of her children, citing two
Arkansas cases in which sexual orientation was used as a factor in removing children from
the custody of their lesbian mothers. Affidavit of Elena Picado at 5, Picado (No. 01-815)
(citing Larson v. Larson, 50 Ark. App. 158, 902 S.W.2d 254 (1995); Thigpen v. Carpenter,
21 Ark. App. 194, 199, 730 S.W.2d 510 (1987)). Manire said the Springdale School District
justified the retraction of a proffered contract as a school counselor by claiming they could
not employ him because of the sodomy law. Affidavit of Bryan Manire at 5, Picado (No. 01-
815). Townsand, a registered nurse, stated that he had been exposed to numerous anti-gay
comments at work and pointed out that the Arkansas State Board of Nursing had the author-
ity to revoke his license for committing any crime, including sodomy. Affidavit of George
Townsand at 7, Picado (No. 01-815). Stokay recalled a frightening encounter with Little
Rock police officers who taunted him for being gay, and he cited documentation of other
abusive behavior by Arkansas law enforcement officials. Affidavit of Vernon Stokey at 4,
Picado (No. 01-815). McCain gave several accounts of anti-gay harassment, assault, and
negative employment actions. Affidavit of Randy McCain at 7-8, Picado (No. 01-815).
White submitted a copy of her lease into the record, noting that her landlord reserved the
right to enter her home under certain circumstances and that she could be evicted if she were
caught committing a crime. Affidavit of Robin White at 7, Picado (No. 01-815).
35. Picado v. Jegley, CV 99-7048 (6th Div. Pulaski County Cir. Ct. Mar. 23, 2001).
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introduced in 1991, 1993, and 1995.36 All died in the Arkansas General As-
sembly's Judiciary Committee."
In an order issued March 23, 2001, Pulaski County Circuit Judge
David Bogard held that Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-14-122 violated
privacy rights guaranteed by the Arkansas Constitution. 38 The court also
held that the statute violated the Arkansas Equal Rights Amendment be-
cause it criminalized conduct based on the sex of the participants. 39 The
State appealed the decision directly to the Arkansas Supreme Court.4°
III. BACKGROUND
Individual rights for most Americans expanded dramatically during the
last half of the twentieth century.41 The trend began with United States Su-
preme Court decisions in the 1960s that applied certain provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the states.42 Changes in the Court-notably the
retirement of Chief Justice Earl Warren and his replacement by Chief Jus-
tice Warren Burger-ended this period of sweeping change43 and halted the
movement toward broader application of the Federal Bill of Rights.44 Presi-
dent Richard Nixon opposed the "egalitarian jurisprudence 'A5 of the Warren
Court, and he and President Ronald Reagan made conservative judicial ap-
pointments.46
The second wave of this trend began when state courts began to step
into the vacuum, taking on new roles as protectors of civil liberties. 47 Ini-
tially criticized by judges, legal scholars, and others as an attempt to under-
mine the power of the Burger Court, judicial activism quickly spread among
36. S.B. 378, 80th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 1995); S.B. 565, 79th Gen. Assem.,
Reg. Sess. (Ark. 1993); S.B. 125, 78th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 1991).
37. Picado, 349 Ark. at 621, 80 S.W.3d at 342-43.
38. Picado v. Jegley, CV 99-7048 (6th Div. Pulaski County Cir. Ct. Mar. 23, 2001)
(granting summary judgment to plaintiffs and denying summary judgment to defendants).
39. Id.
40. Picado v. Jegley, CV 99-7048 (6th Div. Pulaski County Cir. Ct. Apr. 23, 2001)
(giving notice of appeal).
41. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Con-
stitutions as Guardians ofIndividual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 535, 540 (1986).
42. Id. The Warren Court fundamentally changed the law of the United States with
broad reforms that nationalized civil rights guarantees. Id. at 545.
43. G. Alan Tarr, The New Judicial Federalism in Perspective, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1097, 1097 (1997).
44. Brennan, supra note 41, at 546.
45. Nixon used the term "egalitarian jurisprudence" during his 1968 presidential cam-
paign to express opposition to the expansion of civil liberties under the Warren Court. Mi-
chael Esler, Part I: Equality in American Law, 1998 ST. LOUIS-WARSAW TRANSATLANTIC
L.J. 105, 126.
46. Id.
47. Tarr, supra note 43, at 1097-98.
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state courts and gained widespread acceptance.48 Legal scholars refer to this
national phenomenon, well-established by the late 1990s, as the "new judi-
cial federalism.,
49
Recognizing civil rights for gay and lesbian citizens is a prime exam-
ple of how state courts have, in recent decades, found greater protections
under their own constitutions than those provided by federal law. 50 The in-
validation or repeal of criminal sodomy 51 laws in most states is a notewor-
thy consequence of this trend.52 The United States Supreme Court has held
that consenting adults have no constitutionally protected right to engage in
homosexual sodomy,53 and prior to 1961 all fifty states outlawed the prac-
tice. 4 By early 2002 courts in nine states had invalidated their sodomy
laws.
5
This section will briefly examine the scope of the new judicial federal-
ism and the Arkansas Supreme Court's place in this trend prior to Jegley v.
56 ~ wlPicado. The author will then put Picado in context by summarizing the
United States Supreme Court's decisions involving civil rights for lesbians
and gays. The section concludes with a snapshot of sodomy laws, decisions




50. ALAN S. YANG, FROM WRONGS TO RIGHTS: PUBLIC OPINION ON GAY AND LESBIAN
AMERICANS MOVES TOWARD EQUALITY 6-9, 14-16, available at http://www.ngltf.org (last
visited Mar. 24, 2003). Though beyond the scope of this note, public opinion has significant
impact on legal policy affecting homosexuals, particularly in state courts, which are inher-
ently closer to the people. Id. Favorable attitudes toward equal rights and opportunities for
homosexual citizens have increased on several fronts including employment, housing, and
family issues. Id.
51. One of the challenges faced by courts and legislatures discussing sodomy is how to
define the crime. Harris v. Alaska, 457 P.2d 638 (Alaska 1969), was an early attempt by a
plaintiff who was convicted of a "crime against nature" to have the law declared unconstitu-
tional and void for vagueness. Id. The Harris court affirmed the conviction, but remanded for
an amended judgment changing the crime to sodomy. ld. at 649. The opinion includes a
discussion of the problems inherent in defining sodomy. Id. at 642. The author of the Harris
opinion noted that many judicial opinions will decline to name particular acts but will assert
that the "loathsome" acts committed by the defendant have always been prohibited under the
statutes in question. Id. The results are confusing and, arguably, unconstitutionally vague.
Id; see also Arthur E. Brooks, Note, Doe and Dronenburg: Sodomy Statutes Are Constitu-
tional, 26 WM. & MARY L. REv. 645, 647-48 (1985).
52. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 193-94 (1986).
53. Id. at 189.
54. Id. at 193-94. In 1961 Illinois became the first state to decriminalize private, adult,
consensual sexual conduct by adopting the relevant provision of the American Law Insti-
tute's Model Penal Code. Id.
55. Jegley v. Picado, 349 Ark. 600, 626, 80 S.W.3d 332, 345 (2002).
56. Id, 80 S.W.3d at 346.
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A. The New Judicial Federalism and the Arkansas Supreme Court
State courts vary widely in their enthusiasm for new judicial federal-
ism.57 Some sparked the movement in the 1970s, energizing local discussion
of civil rights protections and bringing new vigor to state constitutions.
8
Over the past thirty years, the high courts of most states have participated to
some degree. 59 This section will begin with a short review of the historical
context of the new judicial federalism, move to a look at its current manifes-
tations, and end with a discussion of the Arkansas Supreme Court's re-
sponse to the trend.
1. The New Judicial Federalism
Some legal scholars see the new era of judicial federalism as a re-
emergence of state constitutions as the primary guarantors of individual
rights.60 In the early days of the United States, most political leaders be-
lieved that decentralization of government power was the key to protecting
political and civil liberties. 61 Before the 1868 ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the United States Supreme Court applied the Bill of Rights
only to the federal government.62 The Civil War convinced many citizens
that the states could not be trusted to protect their civil rights.63 Thus, the
war created a widespread desire for the federal government to take a
stronger role in protecting citizens against unconstitutional actions by the
states.64 Shortly after the war, the states ratified the Fourteenth Amendment,
which guarantees that:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privi-
leges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state
deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of
57. Brennan, supra note 41, at 548-49.
58. Id.
59. Tarr, supra note 43, at 1098.
60. 3 MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL §§ 6-3 to -4,
at 266-68 (2d ed. LEXIS 2000); Tarr, supra note 43, at 1098.
61. Brennan, supra note 41, at 537-40. State governments were closer to the people
and, presumably, more responsive to the concerns of ordinary people than the distant federal
government. Id. at 537. Therefore, citizens looked to their respective states for protection of
personal liberties. Id.
62. Id.; see also Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833) (holding that the
Federal Bill of Rights does not apply to the states).




law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.
65
Since that time, the Supreme Court has struggled to determine how to apply
the Fourteenth Amendment and other constitutionally guaranteed civil liber-
ties to the states.66
United States Supreme Court oversight of personal liberties reached a
high water mark under Chief Justice Warren during the 1960s,67 when the
Court made a dizzying series of decisions expanding civil rights protec-
tions.68 The first such case was Mapp v. Ohio,69 in which the Court extended
the exclusionary evidence rule to state courts.70 Subsequent cases extended
federal protections against cruel and unusual punishment,71  self-
72 .73incrimination, and double jeopardy. During the same period, the Court
upheld the right of counsel,74 the right of the accused to be confronted by
the witnesses against him, 75 the right to a speedy trial, 76 the right to trial by
an impartial jury,77 and the right to have compulsory subpoenas of wit-
nesses.7 1 Meanwhile, state supreme courts had essentially abdicated any role
65. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
66. Brennan, supra note 41, at 537-38.
67. 3 PERLIN, supra note 60, § 6-3, at 266.
68. Brennan, supra note 41, at 541.
69. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
70. See id. at 660. The rule states that evidence obtained in unconstitutional searches
may not be used in criminal prosecutions. Id.
71. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962) (striking a state statute
criminalizing addiction to narcotics).
72. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). This case led to the famous decision in
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), requiring police to warn suspects against self-
incrimination. Brennan, supra note 41, at 544.
73. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969). Double jeopardy, prohibited by the
Fifth Amendment, is "[t]he fact of being prosecuted twice for substantially the same of-
fense." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 506 (7th ed. 1999).
74. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding petitioner's trial and con-
viction without benefit of council violative of the Fourteenth Amendment).
75. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965) (holding that the right of a criminal
defendant to confront witnesses against him is a fundamental right).
76. See Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (declaring unconstitutional a
procedural device whereby the accused was discharged from custody but remained subject to
future prosecution at the discretion of the prosecutor).
77. See Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 (1966) (reversing a second degree murder
conviction obtained subsequent to a bailiff's comment to the jury that the defendant was
guilty).
78. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (striking two state statutes preventing
a person accused of a crime from testifying for a coparticipant).
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they might have played in defining individual rights. 79 During the Warren
Court years, neither citizens nor courts saw state constitutions as robust
defenders of civil liberties.
80
The trend changed radically in the 1970s with the advent of the new
judicial federalism. 81 The United States Supreme Court began a period dis-
82tinguished by a retrenchment of civil liberties. For reasons on which legal
scholars disagree,83 state supreme courts almost immediately began to fill
the void.84 Invigorated by the activism of the Warren Court, state judges and
civil rights litigants looked to state courts as fora for constitutional interpre-
tation. 5 During the next two decades, state courts decided more than 300
cases holding that their state constitutions granted broader rights than the
federal floor.86 A recent study of twenty-five states indicated that the expan-
sion of rights under state constitutions has been most active in the areas of
87free exercise of religion, jury trial, and search and seizure. State courts
have issued opinions on a variety of constitutional issues, however, includ-
ing civil rights for homosexual citizens.
88
79. Tarr, supra note 43, at 1 100-01. Although states had relatively more power during
the first 150 years of the United States, constitutional disputes in general were fairly rare
during this period, so the impact of state supreme court decisions was actually small. Id.
80. 3 PERLIN, supra note 60, § 6-3, at 266.
81. Brennan, supra note 41, at 548.
82. Id. at 546; see also, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (revoking the
rule that a search warrant must be supported by probable cause when an officer relied on it in
good faith).
83. Douglas S. Reed, Popular Constitutionalism: Toward a Theory of State Constitu-
tional Meanings, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 871, 874-75 (1999). Most scholars see the new judicial
federalism as largely judge-driven, but others argue that state courts are highly responsive to
political pressures from social movements and interest groups. Id.
84. Tarr, supra note 43, at 1112.
85. Id. at 1112-13. State constitutions, as interpreted by state courts, may mandate more
expansive civil rights than the minimum required by the United States Constitution. Id. at
1112.
86. Id. at 1112-13. Only ten similar cases were decided during the previous twenty
years. Id.
87. James N.G. Cauthen, Expanding Rights Under State Constitutions: A Quantitative
Appraisal, 63 ALB. L. REv. 1183, 1195-97 (2000). For example, seven of the eight state
decisions on free exercise rejected the United States Supreme Court's decision in Employ-
ment Division, Department of Human Services of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990),
which permitted increased governmental restriction on religious practices. Cauthen, supra, at
1197. In Smith, members of the Native American Church were discharged from employment
for their sacramental use of peyote, an illegal drug. Smith, 494 U.S. at 874. The Court held
that the State's subsequent denial of unemployment benefits was not unconstitutional. Id. at
882.
88. Elizabeth A. Leveno, Comment, New Hope for the New Federalism: State Constitu-
tional Challenges to Sodomy Statutes, 62 U. CIN. L. REv. 1029, 1030 (1994). For an exten-
sive discussion on the issue of state sodomy statutes, see Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842
S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992).
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2. The Arkansas Supreme Court
Early in 2002 the Arkansas Supreme Court signaled its acceptance of
the new judicial federalism in Griffin v. State.89 In Griffin, the defendant
was convicted of drug-related offenses using evidence obtained during a
warrantless search of his home.90 On appeal he argued that the search vio-
lated article 2, section 15 of the Arkansas Constitution.9' The court reversed
and remanded the case with an order to suppress the evidence obtained by
the illegal search.92 The Griffin court emphasized that its holding was based
on the state constitution and asserted its "authority to impose greater restric-
tions on police activities in our state based upon our own state law than
those the Supreme Court holds to be necessary based upon federal constitu-
tional standards. 93 In classic judicial federalism language, the court noted:
[W]e now depart from our earlier decisions wherein this court has de-
clared that the Arkansas Constitution provides no greater protection than
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. We previously
noted that the wording of each document is comparable, and through the
years, in construing this part of the Arkansas Constitution, we have fol-
lowed the United States Supreme Court's cases. Current interpretation of
the United States Constitution in the federal courts no longer mirrors our
interpretation of our own constitution.
94
Shortly after the Griffin decision, the court considered State v. Sulli-
van,95 which had been remanded by the United States Supreme Court.96 The
issue on appeal was whether the court could suppress evidence seized in a
search after a pretextual arrest.97 Following Griffin the Arkansas Supreme
89. 347 Ark. 788, 67 S.W.3d 582 (2002).
90. Id., 67 S.W.3d at 582.
91. Id. at 793, 67 S.W.3d at 585; see ARK. CONST. art. 2, § 15 (providing that "the right
of the people of this State to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated").
92. Griffin, 347 Ark. at 791, 67 S.W.3d at 584.
93. Id. at 791-92, 67 S.W.3d at 584.
94. Id. at 804, 67 S.W.3d at 593 (Hannah, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).
95. 348 Ark. 647, 74 S.W.3d 215 (2002).
96. Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769 (2001).
97. State v. Sullivan, 340 Ark. 315, 11 S.W.3d 526 (2000), overruled by Arkansas v.
Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769 (2001). The defendant was stopped for going forty miles-per-hour in
a thirty-five mile-per-hour zone. Id. at 316, 11 S.W.3d at 526. He was unable to produce his
registration and proof of insurance. Id., 11 S.W.3d at 526. A rusted roofing hatchet-the
defendant was a disabled former roofer-was corroding into the floor of the car. Id., 11
S.W.3d at 526. The officer, who admittedly had reason to believe the defendant was involved
with illegal drugs, arrested the defendant for speeding, carrying a weapon, and driving with-
out registration and insurance. See id, 11 S.W.3d at 526. A subsequent search of the vehicle
turned up illegal drugs and paraphernalia. Id., 11 S.W.3d at 527. The Arkansas Supreme
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Court reiterated its independence and used state grounds to determine what
police conduct is reasonable under the Arkansas Constitution. The holdings
in Griffin and Sullivan foreshadowed the dramatic opinion to come a few
weeks later in Jegley v. Picado.98
B. Civil Rights and Homosexuality
The new judicial federalism has had a significant effect on the civil
rights of homosexuals. 99 Achieving only limited success at the federal
level,' 00 gays and lesbians have increasingly turned to state courts and legis-
latures in a search for equality.' 0 ' One of the most popular targets of gay
rights activists has been state laws prohibiting the practice of sodomy.
0 2
Although many current laws and regulations affect their lives, 0 3 the at-
tempts to regulate their sexuality by the criminalization of sodomy vividly
illustrates the legal status of gay men and lesbians.
This section will examine privacy and equal protection rights in the
context of two key United States Supreme Court opinions discussing homo-
sexuality and sodomy. It will then briefly address the legal status of acts
termed "sodomy" in the fifty states and the District of Columbia. Finally,
the author will take a more detailed look at the treatment of sodomy by the
Arkansas Supreme Court.
1. Homosexuality and the United States Supreme Court
The United States Supreme Court did not directly address the rights of
homosexuals until the mid-1980s.10 4 Gay rights advocates and legal scholars
Court affirmed the lower court's decision to allow suppression of this evidence, finding that
the arrest was only a pretext to support the search. Id. at 317, 11 S.W.3d at 527.
98. 349 Ark. 600, 80 S.W.3d 332 (2002).
99. See infra Part III.B.2.
100. See infra Part III.B.1.
101. See infra Part III.B.2.
102. See supra Part III.A.2. One modem definition of sodomy is: "1. Oral or anal copula-
tion between humans, esp. those of the same sex. 2. Oral or anal copulation between a human
and an animal; bestiality.-Also termed buggery; crime against nature; abominable and
detestable crime against nature; unnatural offense; [and] unspeakable crime." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1396-97 (7th ed. 1999).
103. Nancy K. Ota, Queer Recount, 64 ALB. L. REV. 889, 893-99 (2001). The Republi-
can Unity Coalition was formed to promote diversity within the Republican Party by helping
it respond constructively to issues of concern to gays and lesbians. Id. at 898. Ota suggests an
agenda of issues that the coalition urgently needs to address: same-sex marriage, military
service (the Republican Party Platform in 2000 stated that homosexuals should not be al-
lowed to serve), adoption (President Bush supports limiting adoption to married couples),




have criticized the Court for what they perceive as a reluctance to partici-
pate in this highly charged debate affecting the lives of millions of Ameri-
cans. °5 When the Supreme Court has granted certiorari and entered the
fray, results have been mixed.10 6 During the past two decades, the Court
decided nine cases involving the status of lesbians and gays.10 7 Five of those
decisions were favorable to homosexuals, 0 8 and four were not.0 9 The
Court's trend is toward greater involvement in homosexual rights issues
than in the past and, arguably, toward greater protection. 1 ° The Court has
decided four relevant cases since 1996, three of them favorably to gay
rights.. and the fourth restricting gay rights by only a narrow margin.' 2 In
December 2002 the United States Supreme Court agreed to hear an appeal
104. Jeff Bleich & Kelly Klaus, Unfinished Trilogy: The Supreme Court and Sexual
Orientation, 62 OR. ST. B. BULL. 9 (2002). The Court had not previously granted certiorari to
any cases involving gay rights, although it came close with Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney
for the City of Richmond, 425 U.S. 901 (1976), which garnered three of the four votes neces-
sary for the Court to hear oral arguments. Scott Patrick Johnson, An Analysis of the U.S.
Supreme Court's Decision Making in Gay Rights Cases (1985-2000), 27 OHIO N.U. L. REV.
197, 199 n.9 (2001).
105. Bleich & Klaus, supra note 104, at 9. For an extensive discussion of the treatment of
homosexuality by the United States Supreme Court, including analyses of major opinions
and denials of certiorari and biographical information about justices and litigants, see JOYCE
MURDOCH & DEB PRICE, COURTING JUSTICE: GAY MEN AND LESBIANS V. THE SUPREME
COURT (2001).
106. Johnson, supra note 104, at 197.
107. Id. at 198.
108. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998) (finding non-symptomatic HIV to be a
disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act); Onscale v. Sundowner Offshore
Servs., 523 U.S. 75 (1998) (holding that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits
same-sex harassment); Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1998) (holding that national security
interests do not preclude federal courts from ruling on the dismissal of a CIA employee be-
cause of his sexual orientation); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (ruling that a Colo-
rado ballot initiative denying protections to homosexuals in state and local government vio-
lated equal protection rights); Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City v. Nat'l Gay Task Force, 470 U.S.
903 (1985) (leaving a lower court ruling invalidating an Oklahoma law firing teachers who
advocated homosexual conduct, but not establishing a controlling precedent because the vote
was split four to four).
109. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (ruling that the Boy Scouts could
discharge a scoutmaster for identifying himself as gay); Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian &
Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557 (1995) (ruling that the St. Patrick's Day Parade
did not have to allow participation by a group identified as homosexual); San Francisco Arts
& Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522 (1987) (denying the use of
the word "Olympic" to the organizers of the Gay Olympics); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186 (1986) (finding no fundamental privacy right to engage in homosexual sodomy).
110. Johnson, supra note 104, at 227.
111. See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 624; Onscale, 523 U.S. at 75; Webster, 486 U.S. at 592.
112. See Boy Scouts of Am., 530 U.S. at 642. The vote was five to four, with Justices
Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joining in a lengthy dissent. Id.
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of Lawrence v. Texas, which upheld a Texas statute prohibiting same-sex
sodomy." 3
a. The federal right to privacy and the criminalization of sod-
omy
The United States Supreme Court has found constitutional privacy
rights based on two fundamental principles: the sanctity of the family and
the autonomy of the individual." 4 Family-based rights support privacy re-
lated to the nurture and education of children,' 5 marital relations," 6 and
procreation." 7 In Prince v. Massachusetts, the Court defined a "private
realm of family life" protected from governmental intrusion.' In Moore v.
City of East Cleveland," 9 the Court emphasized the importance of the fam-
ily as a vital economic and social unit, indicating that the family's right to
privacy is collective rather than individual. 20
The Court, however, has also recognized individual privacy guarantees
as an extension of personal autonomy.' 2' In Eisenstadt v. Baird122 and Carey
v. Population Services International,123 the Court held that unmarried per-
sons and minors have a protected right to use contraceptives. 124 The right to
abortion affirmed in Roe v. Wade 25 was granted to married and unmarried
women alike. 126 The Roe opinion stated that the Court recognized the right
of personal privacy under the United States Constitution as early as the late
113. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 661 (2002) (granting certiorari to Lawrence v. Texas,
41 S.W.3d 349 (Tex. App. 2001)).
114. Yao Apasu-Gbotsu et al., Survey on the Constitutional Right to Privacy in the Con-
text of Homosexual Activity, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 521, 566 (1986).
115. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166, 169 (1944) (acknowledging a "pri-
vate realm of family life," but affirming a ruling prohibiting a family member from involving
a child in "street preaching").
116. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (holding that the marital
relationship is within a "zone of privacy" protected from state interference).
117. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l., 431 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977) (holding that the
right to decide whether to have a child is within the familial "zone of privacy").
118. Prince, 321 U.S. at 166.
119. 431 U.S. 494(1977).
120. Apasu-Gbotsu, supra note 114, at 579.
121. ALLAN IDES & CHRISTOPHER N. MAY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
78 (2d ed. 2001).
122. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
123. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
124. See Carey, 431 U.S. at 682; Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 440.
125. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
126. Id. at 120. Jane Roe was pregnant and unmarried when she brought an action against
the District Attorney in Dallas County, Texas, seeking a declaratory judgment that the Texas
criminal abortion statute was unconstitutional. Id. The United States Supreme Court agreed
with the district court decision striking down the statute. Id. at 166.
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nineteenth century. 127 In Carey, the Court began to refer to this concept as
the "right of autonomy," emphasizing the individualized nature of the
right. 28 The Court has discussed privacy rights in a number of contexts,
notably in connection with questions about search and seizure issues. 1
29
In 1986 the Court discussed the fundamental right to privacy and its
application to homosexual sodomy in Bowers v. Hardwick.130 The case
arose when police officers, investigating an unrelated crime, entered Mi-
chael Hardwick's bedroom, found him in bed with another adult male, and
arrested him for sodomy.' 31 Although the Atlanta District Attorney declined
to press charges against Hardwick, 132 the American Civil Liberties Union
challenged the Georgia law on his behalf. 33 Hardwick challenged the con-
stitutionality of the Georgia sodomy statute in federal district court, which
dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. 34 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed, and the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the constitutionality of the
Georgia statute only as applied to homosexual sodomy.' 
35
The Court used Bowers to explore the limits it should properly set on
the right to privacy, which is not explicitly protected by the United States
Constitution.136 The granting of implicit rights, according to the opinion,
calls for particular caution because the citizenry must be assured that the
rights are based on the Constitution rather than the values and opinions of
the justices themselves. 137 Classifying previously identified privacy rights as
127. Id. at 152 (citing Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)).
128. IDES & MAY, supra note 121, at 78.
129. John W. Whitehead & Steven H. Aden, Forfeiting "Enduring Freedom" for
"Homeland Security:" A Constitutional Analysis of the USA Patriot Act and the Justice
Department's Anti-Terrorism Initiatives, 51 AM. U. L. REv. 1081, 1101-03, 1131-32
(2002); see, e.g., infra note 314 (discussing privacy rights and the use of new technology for
search and seizure).
130. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
131. Bleich & Klaus, supra note 104, at 9.
132. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 188. A violation of the statute under which Hardwick was
charged carried a penalty of up to twenty years in prison. Id.
133. Johnson, supra note 104, at 199-200.
134. Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202 (1 1th Cir. 1985), overruled by Bowers v.
Hardwick 478 U.S. 186 (1986). The district court ruled that Hardwick had standing to bring
the suit but that he had no legal claim in light of the United States Supreme Court's affir-
mance of a federal district court decision upholding the Virginia sodomy statute. Id. at 1204;
see also Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney for City of Richmond, 425 U.S. 901 (1976), aff'g
403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D.Va. 1975).
135. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 189. A heterosexual couple, John and Mary Doe, had joined the
case to challenge the statute's prohibition on heterosexual sodomy, but the district court held
they had sustained no injury and therefore lacked standing. Id. at 188.
136. Id. at 191-92.
137. Id. at 190.
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dealing with family, marriage, and procreation, 138 the Court distinguished
consensual, non-procreative sex acts and decided that homosexual activities
did not qualify for such protection.' 39 The decision was a slim five to four
majority. 140 Justice White, who wrote for the majority in Bowers, grounded
the opinion in historical and institutional precedent. 4' He cited ancient pro-
hibitions against homosexual sodomy and noted that the thirteen original
states had laws prohibiting the conduct and all fifty states outlawed sodomy
until 1961.142
In a long and biting dissent, Justice Blackmun 143 vehemently attacked
the historical basis for the majority opinion, agreeing with the late Justice
Holmes that
[it] is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it
was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the
grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the
rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.
144
Justice Blackmun opined that the protection of intimate relationships within
the home is central to constitutional privacy guarantees. 145 He concluded
that the Bowers holding "poses a far greater threat to the values most deeply
rooted in our Nation's history than tolerance of nonconformity could ever
do. 146
b. The federal right to equal protection and homosexuals as a
protected class
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits
state governments from denying any person the equal protection of the
138. Id. The Court looked at cases such as Carey v. Population Services International,
431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswoldv. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965); and Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
139. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191.
140. Id. at 186. Three years after his retirement from the United States Supreme Court,
Justice Lewis F. Powell confessed to an audience at the New York University Law School
that he had probably been wrong to cast the critical swing vote against the plaintiff in Bow-
ers. Mark A. Graber, Judicial Recantation, 45 SYRACUSE L. REv. 807 (1994). After the deci-
sion, Justice Powell reviewed the arguments on both sides. Id. On reflection, he decided that
the dissent had the better arguments. Id.
141. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192-93.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens joined
Justice Blackmun's dissent.
144. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the
Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897)).
145. Id. at 208 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 214 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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laws. 147 Most laws discriminate by classifying individuals according to cer-
tain behaviors or personal characteristics. 48 The Constitution requires that
such discrimination be based on legitimate government purposes, as ana-
lyzed under a three-tier model of review.1 49 A law selectively infringing on
a fundamental right or discriminating based on race, citizenship, or national
origin is subjected to strict scrutiny, the most stringent standard of re-
view. 5 To survive a strict scrutiny review, a law or practice must be nar-
rowly tailored to further a compelling government interest. 5 ' The Court
subjects classifications based on gender to an intermediate standard. 152 To
be constitutional under an intermediate level of scrutiny, a classification
must serve an important government objective by using means substantially
related to the objective. 53 Lowest and most deferential to legislative law-
makers, the rational basis standard requires that there be some conceivable
public purpose justifying a discriminatory statute.1
54
Ten years after Bowers, 55 the United States Supreme Court considered
gay rights under the Equal Protection Clause.' 56 In Romer v. Evans, 57 the
Court ruled on the constitutionality of Amendment 2, a Colorado voter ini-
tiative prohibiting the granting of protected legal status based on sexual
orientation. 58 Amendment 2 would have voided several state and local
147. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdic-
tion thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they re-
side. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Id.
148. IDES & MAY, supra note 121, at 184. For example, speed limits and child labor laws
treat individuals differently according to behavior and age. Id.
149. Id. at 185.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 206.
152. Id. at 234.
153. ld. at 236.
154. IDES & MAY, supra note 121, at 199-200.
155. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
156. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
157. Id.
158. Id. The amendment read:
No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian or Bisexual Orientation.
Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor
any of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall
enact, adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby ho-
mosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships
shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person or class of per-
sons to have or claim any minority status, quota preferences, protected status or
claim of discrimination.
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Colorado laws and regulations banning discrimination against homosexuals
in employment, housing, public accommodations, insurability, and educa-
tion.15 9 The State argued that the amendment only denied "special rights,"
putting gays and lesbians into the same position as other citizens. 60 The
Court, in a six to three decision, disagreed, holding that Amendment 2 was
unconstitutional as a status-based enactment unrelated to legitimate public
interests. 161
Without actually deciding the level of review required, the Romer
Court found that Amendment 2 did not even survive the rational basis
test.162 Under a rational basis review, a court asks whether the classification
of persons based on sexual orientation bears a "rational relation to some
legitimate end."163 The Court acknowledged there are circumstances under
which a classification may be justified, even though it results in disadvan-
tage to a particular group.' 64 If such a classification does not target a suspect
class 165 or interfere with a fundamental right 166 and is rationally related to a
legitimate public purpose, the Court will allow it.167 The purpose of judicial
scrutiny of discriminatory mandates is to ensure that laws creating classifi-
cations of citizens are not devised to stigmatize or otherwise harm unpopu-
lar groups.168 The Romer Court concluded that Amendment 2 was so broad
Id. at 624.
159. Id. at 626. The Colorado laws and regulations in question also protected against
discrimination based on a variety of other characteristics such as age, marital status, parent-
hood, and political affiliation. Id. at 629. The purpose of Amendment 2 was to prohibit the
inclusion of homosexuals and bisexuals in such protection. Id.
160. Id. at 626.
161. Id. at 635.
162. Romer, 517 U.S. at 635.
163. Id. at 631. For other United States Supreme Court applications of the rational basis
test, see Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319-20 (1993), and Railroad Retirement Board v.
Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 181 (1980).
164. Romer, 517 U.S. at 632. The Court gave several examples including New Orleans v.
Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976) (singling out certain pushcart vendors for special treatment
justified by benefits to tourism), and Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S.
483 (1955) (holding that a law favoring optometrists over opticians was justified by legiti-
mate health concerns).
165. Craig D. Moreshead, Note, Evans v. Romer and Amendment 2: Homosexuality and
the Constitutional Dilemma, 24 CAP. U. L. REV. 485, 486 (1995). Factors considered in the
determination of the appropriate level of review for a particular group include the immutabil-
ity of its defining characteristic, the history of its treatment by society, and its relative politi-
cal and social strength. Id. Homosexuals do not comprise a suspect class. Romer, 517 U.S. at
642 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
166. Romer, 517 U.S. at 631. Fundamental rights include those that are deeply ingrained
in our national tradition and are deemed necessary to liberty and justice. Moreshead, supra
note 165, at 486.
167. Romer, 517 U.S. at 631.
168. Id. at 633.
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in scope and so unrelated to specific, legitimate public objectives that it
could not pass the test.
1 69
In Romer it was Justice Scalia170 who wrote an impassioned dissent,
arguing that the Romer holding was in direct opposition to Bowers, which
the majority opinion did not discuss. 171 Justice Scalia asserted that sodomy
is the conduct that defines the homosexual class. 172 If criminalizing such
conduct passes constitutional muster, he argued, how can it be unconstitu-
tional for states to prohibit the protection of a class of people defined by
their propensity to engage in the conduct? 173 Justice Scalia characterized
homosexuals as belonging not to a class of citizens who could be harmed by
the animosity of Colorado voters, but as individuals behaving in ways that
the majority of citizens understandably finds reprehensible. 174 He accused
the Court of participating in "culture wars" 175 and called the majority opin-
ion "an act, not of judicial judgment, but of political will" with "no founda-
tion in American constitutional law."
' 176
2. Homosexuality and the States
Ancient prohibitions 77 on various acts characterized as sodomy found
their way into the statutory or common law of all thirteen of the original
states.178 When the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868, sodomy
was a crime in most of the existing states; by 1961 all fifty states outlawed
heterosexual and homosexual sodomy. 179 As social mores began to change,
forty-one states invalidated or repealed their laws prohibiting opposite-sex
sodomy.1 80 Prior to Picado thirty-five states and the District of Columbia
had legalized opposite-sex and same-sex sodomy, twenty-six by legislative
repeal and nine by judicial decision. 181 Six states maintained same-sex sod-
omy statutes: Arkansas, Kansas, Michigan, Missouri, Oklahoma, and
169. Id. at 634-35.
170. Id. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas joined
Justice Scalia in his dissent. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
171. Id. at 640 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 641 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
173. Romer, 517 U.S. at 641-43 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
174. Id. at 644-45 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
175. Id. at 652 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
176. Id. at 653 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
177. See Aimee D. Dayhoff, Student Article, Sodomy Laws: The Government's Vehicle
To Impose the Majority's Social Values, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1863, 1865 (2001) (out-
lining a brief history of Judeo-Christian prohibitions on sodomy).
178. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986).
179. Id. at 193.
180. Jegley v. Picado, 349 Ark. 600, 626, 80 S.W.3d 332, 346 (2002); see infra note 182.
181. Picado, 349 Ark. at 625, 80 S.W.3d at 346.
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Texas. 182 Nine states have statutes prohibiting both same-sex and opposite-
sex sodomy: Alabama, Florida, Idaho, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Caro-
lina, South Carolina, Utah, and Virginia.'
83
3. Homosexuality and the State ofArkansas
Until 1975 homosexual and heterosexual sodomy alike were crimes in
Arkansas and punishable with terms of imprisonment in the penitentiary for
up to twenty-one years. 84 The old statute and case law prohibited a broad
range of sexual activities. Arkansas courts struggled to define the crime
"called sometimes buggery, sometimes the offense against nature, and
sometimes the horrible crime not fit to be named among Christians, being a
carnal copulation by human beings with each other against nature, or with a
beast."' 185 In 1925 the Arkansas Supreme Court defined sodomy as consist-
ing of "unnatural sexual relations between persons of the same sex, or with
beasts, or between persons of different sex, but in an unnatural manner."'
' 86
In 1973 an appellant charged with an act of same-sex fellatio commit-
ted in an automobile parked on a public road argued to the Arkansas Su-
preme Court that the state's sodomy statute was unconstitutional on the
grounds that it was vague and broad, established a religion, and invaded his
right of privacy. 87 The court dismissed these arguments in a short opinion,
stating that sodomy is simply and clearly defined as "an unnatural sex act
which is condemned" and that there is widespread agreement about what
that means.' 88 "It is the opposite of a natural sex act; the manner of a natu-
ral sex act is well known, even to the young and the uneducated.' ' 89 Ad-
dressing the allegation that the prohibition on sodomy established a religion,
the court held that it did not, pointing out that many criminal statutes would
be "emasculated" if acts regarded as sinful by religious groups could not be
182. Statutes prohibiting same-sex sodomy as of June 2002 were: ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-
14-122 (Michie Repl. 1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3505 (1995); MICH. STAT. ANN. 750.158
(Michie 1991); Mo. REV. STAT. § 566.090 (1999); OKLA. STAT tit. 21 § 886 (1983); and TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06 (Vernon 1989).
183. See ALA. CODE §§ 13A-6-63 to -65 (1975); FLA. ST. CH. § 800.02 (2002); IDAHO
CODE § 18-6605 (Matthew Bender 2002); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:89 (West 1986); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 97-29-59 (1972); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-177 (1994); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-
120 (Law. Co-op. 1985); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-403 (1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-361
(Michie 1994).
184. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-813 (Bobbs-Merrill 1947) (repealed 1975).
185. Strum v. State, 168 Ark. 1012, 1014, 272 S.W. 359, 359 (1925) (quoting I BISHOP
ON CRIMINAL LAW 1191 (1923)); see also Smith v. State, 150 Ark. 265, 267, 234 S.W. 32, 32
(1921).
186. Strum, 168 Ark. at 1014, 272 S.W. at 359.
187. Conner v. State, 253 Ark. 854, 855, 490 S.W.2d 114, 115 (1973).
188. Id., 490 S.W.2d at 115.
189. 1d. at 856, 490 S.W.2d at 115.
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regulated.190 Finally, the court refused to consider the privacy argument
since the appellant committed the illegal act in a public place. 91
Later that year the court considered the constitutionality of the statute
in greater depth in Carter v. State.'92 There, the appellants argued that the
law: (1) invaded their right to privacy under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth,
Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution; (2)
deprived them of their constitutional rights because it was so vague and
ambiguous; (3) served no legitimate state interest as applied to them; and
(4) imposed cruel and unusual punishment.' 93 Noting the presumption of
constitutionality accorded to statutes and placing a heavy burden of proof on
the appellants, the court rejected each of these arguments. 94 The longevity
of the statute was of particular importance to the Carter court, observing
that "if such a statute were in violation of federal constitutional principles,
surely the thought would have long since occurred to the many legal schol-
ars and jurists of this state."' 95 The court again refused to consider the pri-
vacy issue because the act in question took place in a public, if secluded,
location. 196 The Carter appellants cited numerous authorities in support of
their contention that sodomy between consenting adults was no longer
broadly condemned by society, thus making its legal prohibition obsolete.'
97
Without addressing the legitimacy of the argument, the court expressly left
the question to the state legislature.
98
The state repealed its sodomy statute in 1975199 and replaced it two
years later with a statute criminalizing only homosexual sodomy.200 In addi-
tion to authorizing criminal sanctions for certain acts between persons of the
same sex, Arkansas's prohibition on sodomy has justified other legal actions
190. Id., 490 S.W.2d at 115.
191. Id.,490S.W.2datl16.
192. 255 Ark. 225, 500 S.W.2d 368 (1973).
193. Id. at 227, 500 S.W.2d at 370. Appellants received eight-year sentences. Id. at 233,
500 S.W.2d at 373.
194. Id. at 228, 500 S.W.2d at 370.
195. Id., 500 S.W.2d at 370.
196. Id. at 229, 500 S.W.2d at 371. The case arose from an incident in which a police
officer discovered the appellants committing same-sex sodomy in Carter's automobile,
which was parked in a rest area adjacent to Interstate 70. Id. at 227-29, 500 S.W.2d at 370-
71. The officer testified that, although it was eleven o'clock at night, the area was well-
lighted and there were many people around. Id., 500 S.W.2d at 370-71.
197. Id. at 230, 500 S.W.2d at 371.
198. Carter, 255 Ark. at 230, 500 S.W.2d at 371.
199. Act of Apr. 8, 1975, No. 928, 1975 Ark. Acts 2463 (repealing ARK. STAT. ANN. §
41-813 (Bobbs-Merrill 1947)).
200. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-122 (Michie Repl. 1997); see supra note 25 (setting forth
the wording of the statute).
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against homosexuals.20 ' The Arkansas Supreme Court has allowed counsel
to attempt to impeach the credibility of a witness by asking whether the
witness had committed sodomy, even where the sexual behavior was unre-
lated to the issues in the case.2°2 The plaintiff in Stowe v. Bowlin,2 °3 whose
truck was damaged when the defendant failed to replace the drain plug after
changing the oil, was questioned by opposing counsel about past acts of
sodomy.20 4 The supreme court upheld the line of questioning as relevant to
the credibility of the plaintiff.20 5 In Thigpen v. Carpenter20 6 the Arkansas
Court of Appeals affirmed a lower court decision in which the mother's
homosexuality was a factor in removing her minor children from her cus-
tody. 20 7 The Thigpen decision held that Arkansas courts have rightly as-
sumed illicit sexual conduct on the part of a parent to be detrimental to chil-
dren.20 8
By the dawn of 1998, activists were determined to change the legal
status of lesbians and gay men in Arkansas.20 9 Their first target was the sod-
omy statute210 that branded them as criminals. 21 Three attempts to repeal
the statute had failed, 1 2 so a judicial challenge was the next logical
choice.21 3 Because no plaintiff had been recently prosecuted under the stat
201. See Stowe v. Bowlin, 259 Ark. 221, 531 S.W.2d 955 (1976); Hale v. State, 252 Ark.
1040, 483 S.W.2d 228 (1972); Larson v. Larson, 50 Ark. App. 158, 902 S.W.2d 254 (1995);
Thigpen v. Carpenter, 21 Ark. App. 194, 199, 730 S.W.2d 510 (1987).
202. Stowe, 259 Ark. at 225-26, 531 S.W.2d at 957-58; Hale, 252 Ark. at 1040, 483
S.W.2d at 228.
203. 259 Ark. at 221, 531 S.W.2d at 955.
204. Id. at 224-25, 531 S.W.2d at 957-58.
205. Id. at 226, 531 S.W.2d at 958.
206. 21 Ark. App. at 199, 730 S.W.2d at 510.
207. Id., 730 S.W.2d at 510; see also Larson v. Larson, 50 Ark. App. 158, 902 S.W.2d
254 (1995). In Larson, the Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision to
change primary custody of two children from their lesbian mother to their father. Larson, 50
Ark. App. at 162, 902 S.W.2d at 256. The majority opinion emphasized that the appellant's
homosexuality was only one of several factors justifying the change in custody. Id., 902
S.W.2d at 256. In a concurring opinion, however, Judge Rogers expressed her concern about
the lower court's obvious disapproval of the appellant's sexual orientation. Id., 902 S.W.2d
at 257 (Rogers, J., concurring). Judge Rogers found the emphasis on that issue troubling and
possibly indicative of an inappropriately punitive approach to a custody decision. Id., 902
S.W.2d at 257 (Rogers, J., concurring).
208. Thigpen, 21 Ark. App. at 198, 730 S.W.2d at 513. Thigpen testified that she and her
lesbian partner had never engaged in physical contact in the presence of her children. Id., 730
S.W.2d at 513.
209. Press Release, supra note 26.
210. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-122 (Michie Repl. 1997).
211. Press Release, supra note 26.
212. See supra text accompanying notes 36-37.
213. Press Release, supra note 26.
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ute, opponents of the law faced problems of justiciability.214 Although the
Arkansas Supreme Court had previously heard constitutional challenges
brought by plaintiffs who had not been prosecuted under the statutes or
regulations in question, such cases were rare.2t5 Nevertheless, seven lesbian
and gay plaintiffs filed suit, alleging that the law violated their federal and
state constitutional rights to privacy and equal protection.21 6 Eventually, the
suit made its way to the Arkansas Supreme Court.
2 17
IV. REASONING
In Picado,218 the Arkansas Supreme Court held that the state's sodomy
statute 219 violates privacy and equal protection rights guaranteed by the Ar-
kansas Constitution. 220 The court first examined the defendants' contention
that, because none of the plaintiffs had been prosecuted under the statute,
there was no justiciable case or controversy. 22' The court then considered
the nature of privacy rights implicit in the state constitution and whether the
statute was violative of those rights.222 Finally, the court asked whether con-
stitutional equal protection guarantees prohibit the state from criminalizing
same-sex sodomy absent any legal sanction against identical behavior be-
tween members of opposite sexes.223
214. CHRISTOPHER N. MAY & ALLEN IDES, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: NATIONAL POWER
AND FEDERALISM § 3 (2d ed. 2001). The term "justiciability" refers to a body of doctrines
that define what issues may properly be brought before a court. Id. Generally, courts will
only decide issues in the context of active cases or controversies. Id. To bring a claim against
the government, a plaintiff must prove a past harm or imminent threat of future harm. Id.
Where the state neglects to enforce a criminal statute by prosecuting those who violate it,
potential challengers of the statute face a justiciability problem because of the speculative
nature of the alleged harm. Id.
215. Among the small number of such cases in the past half century are: Epperson v.
Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (challenging constitutionality of 1928 Arkansas law prohibit-
ing the teaching of evolution in public schools); McGruder v. Arkansas Game & Fish Com-
mission, 287 Ark. 343, 698 S.W.2d 299 (1985) (challenging an agency regulation on the size
of black bass that could be taken from Arkansas lakes); Bennett v. NAACP, 236 Ark. 750,
370 S.W.2d 79 (1963) (declaring four legislative acts, one of which the court found to be
aimed against the NAACP, unconstitutional).
216. Bryant v. Picado, 338 Ark. 227, 230, 996 S.W.2d 17, 18 (1999).
217. Picado v. Jegley, CV 99-7048 (6th Div. Pulaski County Cir. Ct. Mar. 23, 2001).
218. 349 Ark. 600, 80 S.W.3d 332 (2002).
219. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-122 (Michie Repl. 1997).
220. See Picado, 349 Ark. at 638, 80 S.W.3d at 354.
221. Id. at 611, 80 S.W.3d at 336.
222. Id. at 622, 80 S.W.3d at 343.
223. Id. at 632, 80 S.W.3d at 350.
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A. Justiciable Controversy
The threshold issue in the case was whether the matter was justiciable
under Arkansas law.224 In a de novo review, the court looked at similar
cases in state and federal courts,225 but its primary source was its previous
holdings, including Epperson, McGruder, and Bennett.226 Acknowledging
that the plaintiffs lived under the threat of prosecution and a social stigma
supported by the statute, the court found the issue justiciable.227 Because the
state refused to renounce the statute and reserved the right to use it, the
court held that the plaintiffs were caught in an unacceptable "Catch-22. '228
Prosecutors could "effectively bar shut the courthouse doors"229 and prevent
constitutional challenge by not enforcing the statute. 230 Thus, the plaintiffs




Noting that states may guarantee broader civil rights to their citizens
than those recognized under federal law,232 the court was not constrained by
224. Id. at 611, 80 S.W.3d at 336.
225. Id. at 615-16, 80 S.W.3d at 339. For example, the court discussed Babbitt v. United
Farm Workers National Union, 442 U.S. 289, 301 (1979) (holding that a challenge to a pro-
vision of Arizona's farm labor statute was justiciable even though the state claimed it would
not be applied), and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 188-89 (1973) (holding that criminal
prosecution is not required before a plaintiff who alleges an intention to engage in conduct
both proscribed by state and constitutionally protected may seek relief). Picado, 349 Ark. at
615-16, 80 S.W.3d at 339.
226. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); McGruder v. Ark. Game & Fish
Comm'n., 287 Ark. 343, 698 S.W.2d 299 (1985); Bennett v. NAACP, 236 Ark. 750, 370
S.W.2d 79 (1963); see also supra note 215.
227. Picado, 349 Ark. at 622, 80 S.W.3d at 343.
228. Id., 80 S.W.3d at 343.
229. Id., 80 S.W.3d at 343.
230. Id., 80 S.W.3d at 343.
231. Id., 80 S.W.3d at 343.
232. Id., 80 S.W.3d at 344. The United States Supreme Court has held that the Federal
Constitution has no implied right to privacy that protects conduct labeled sodomy. Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). Several recent state court decisions have held that statutes
prohibiting consensual, noncommercial, sexual acts infringe on state privacy guarantees. See
Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18 (Ga. 1998) (invalidating the state's sex-neutral criminal sod-
omy law); Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992) (affirming a lower court
decision that the state sodomy statute violated the appellee's right to privacy and infringed on
state equal protection guarantees); Gryczan v. State, 942 P.2d 112 (Mont. 1997) (striking a
same-gender sodomy statute); Campbell v. Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 250 (Tenn. Ct. App.




the United States Supreme Court's decision in Bowers v. Hardwick.233 Ex-
amining the nature of privacy protections under the Arkansas Constitu-
tion,234 the court observed that the text does not explicitly mention privacy
but that the rights of the people are not limited to those enumerated.235 Sev-
eral sections of article 2 imply privacy guarantees.236 Article 2, section 2
upholds "inherent and inalienable rights" including "enjoying and defending
life and liberty," "protecting . . .reputation," and pursuing happiness.
237
Sections 8 and 21 guarantee due process of law,238 and section 15 recog-
nizes the "right of the people of this State to be secure in their ...
houses. 239 Section 3 mandates that rights provided by the state constitution
are to be given equally to all citizens.24 °
The court then examined Arkansas statutes and rules that address the
issue of privacy. 241 The court noted that the Arkansas General Assembly has
acknowledged such an inherent right by passing more than eighty statutes
that uphold privacy guarantees.242 The Arkansas Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure also support privacy rights explicitly and by judicial interpretation in
233. 478 U.S. at 186.
234. Picado, 349 Ark. at 622, 80 S.W.3d at 343.
235. Id. at 627-28, 80 S.W.3d at 346-47. Specifically, the Arkansas Constitution states:
This enumeration of rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others re-
tained by the people and to guard against any encroachments on the rights herein
retained, or any transgression of any of the higher powers herein delegated, we
declare that everything in this article is excepted out of the general powers of the
government, and shall forever remain inviolate; and that all laws contrary
thereto, or to the other provisions herein contained, shall be void.
ARK. CONST. art. 2, § 29.
236. Picado, 349 Ark. at 627-28, 80 S.W.3d at 346-47.
237. ARK. CONST. art. 2, § 2. "All men are created equally free and independent, and
have certain inherent and inalienable rights, amongst which are those of enjoying and de-
fending life and liberty; of acquiring, possessing and protecting property and reputation, and
of pursuing their own happiness." Id.
238. ARK. CONST. art. 2, §§ 8, 21.
239. ARK. CONST. art. 2, § 15; see supra note 91.
240. ARK. CONST. art. 2, § 3. "The equality of all persons before the law is recognized,
and shall ever remain inviolate; nor shall any citizen ever be deprived of any right, privilege
or immunity, nor exempted from any burden or duty, on account of race, color or previous
condition." Id.
241. Picado, 349 Ark. at 628, 80 S.W.3d at 347.
242. Id. at 629, 80 S.W.3d at 348. The court listed a myriad of examples, illustrating the
variety of privacy rights guaranteed by the state. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-1204(3)
(LEXIS Repl. 1997) (prohibiting unwarranted invasions of privacy by student publications);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-44-203(d) (LEXIS Repl. 1999) (protecting privacy in court-record
videotapes); ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-48-808 (LEXIS Repl. 2000) (requiring reasonable safe-
guards protecting privacy on customer-bank communication terminals).
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Rules 2.2, 8.1, 10.1, 12.1, and 16.2, which pertain to a variety of matters
including investigative law enforcement, searches, arrests, and evidence.243
Finally, the court turned to case law and stated that it had recognized
privacy rights in criminal and civil cases.24 In Fouse v. State,245 a criminal
case, the court said generally that the right of citizens to privacy and secu-
rity in their homes is supported by court rules and the state and federal con-
stitutions.246 The court also noted that in a previous decision upholding the
prior sodomy statute,247 the defendant invoked a right to privacy, but the
court declined to decide the issue because the act in question took place in
public.248 In the realm of civil law, the court enumerated four types of inva-
sion-of-privacy torts recognized by Arkansas courts: appropriation, intru-
sion, public disclosure of private facts, and false light in the public eye.
249
Asserting that Arkansas has "a rich and compelling tradition of protect-
ing individual privacy," the court, for the first time, found privacy to be a
fundamental right implicit in the Arkansas Constitution.250 As a fundamen-
tal right, it is subject to strict scrutiny review. 25' The court articulated the
familiar two-prong test for withstanding strict scrutiny: the statute must
advance a compelling state interest and do so in the least restrictive way
possible.252 Because the defendants had not argued a compelling state inter-
est that would justify the sodomy statute, the court concluded that Arkansas
243. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 2.2 (prohibiting law enforcement officers from falsely indicating
that a person is obligated to furnish information); ARK. R. CRIM. P. 8.1 (proscribing delay in
taking an arrested person before a judicial officer, which was interpreted in Bolden v. State,
262 Ark. 718, 723-24, 561 S.W.2d 281, 284 (1978), as intended to afford protection against
invasion of liberty and privacy); ARK. R. CRIM. P. 10.1 (defining a search, in part, as an
intrusion upon an individual's privacy); ARK. R. CRIM. P. 12.1 (providing that personal
searches be conducted with reasonable regard for privacy); ARK. R. CRIM. P. 16.2 (giving
privacy as a factor to be considered in the determination of whether evidence will be sup-
pressed).
244. Picado, 349 Ark. at 631, 80 S.W.3d at 349.
245. 337 Ark. 13, 989 S.W.2d 146 (1999).
246. Id. at 17, 989 S.W.2d at 150-51.
247. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-813 (Bobbs-Merrill 1947) (repealed 1975).
248. Picado, 349 Ark. at 631, 80 S.W.3d at 349 (citing Carter v. State, 255 Ark. 225,
229, 500 S.W.2d 368, 371 (1973)); see supra notes 192-98 and accompanying text.
249. Picado, 349 Ark. at 631, 80 S.W.3d at 349. Appropriation is the unauthorized use of
one's name or likeness by, and for the benefit of, another. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 851 (5th ed. 1984). Intrusion is an unreasonable and
highly offensive invasion of the seclusion of another. Id. at 854. Public disclosure of private
facts occurs when one creates objectionable publicity about another. Id. at 856. False light in
the public eye is committed when one publicly creates a false impression about another, for
example, by using a person's picture to illustrate a scandalous story with which she has no
connection. Id. at 863-64.
250. Picado, 349 Ark. at 632, 80 S.W.3d at 349-50.
251. Id., 80 S.W.3d at 349-50.
252. Id, 80 S.W.3d at 350.
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Code Annotated section 5-14-122 is "unconstitutional as applied to private,
consensual, noncommercial, same-sex sodomy., 253 At the same time, the
court determined that the right to privacy under the Arkansas Constitution is
broader than that protected by the United States Constitution as interpreted
by the United States Supreme Court.254
C. Equal Protection
The court began its equal protection analysis by looking at relevant
sections of the state and federal constitutions and judicial interpretation of
those provisions.255 The Arkansas Equal Rights Amendment affirms that the
General Assembly may not grant "to any citizen or class of citizens privi-
leges or immunities which upon the same terms shall not equally belong to
all citizens." 256 Under the Federal Equal Protection Clause, a statute may
not mandate dissimilar treatment for "any person." 257 The State argued that
the court should not subject the sodomy statute to an intermediate level of
review, but to the lower rational basis test used in Romer.258 The court said
it did not have to decide the point because the statute could not withstand
even rational basis scrutiny.259 Under the rational basis test, a statute that
identifies a particular group for disparate treatment may not be arbitrary and
capricious, but must be rationally related to legitimate government objec-
tives. 260 The burden of proof lies with the party who challenges the constitu-
tionality of a statute-in this case the lesbian and gay plaintiffs.
26 1
In applying the rational basis test, the court noted that the defendants
justified the use of broad police power to criminalize homosexual sodomy
with the assertion that the prohibited acts offend public morality.262 The
court said that the purpose of equal protection is not to defend majoritarian
morals, but to protect disenfranchised minorities who may be injured by the
imposition of majority values and practices.263 The court agreed that police
power is broad and may be used to enforce the peace and public morals, but
noted that such power is limited to the restraint of behavior actually detri-
253. Id., 80 S.W.3d at 350.
254. Id., 80 S.W.3d at 350.
255. Id., 80 S.W.3d at 350.
256. ARK. CONST. art. 2, § 18.
257. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Picado, 349 Ark. at 633, 80 S.W.3d at 350.
258. Id., 80 S.W.3d at 351; see also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996).
259. Picado, 349 Ark. at 633, 80 S.W.3d at 351.
260. Id. at 634, 80 S.W.3d at 351.
261. Id., 80 S.W.3d at 351 (citing Ester v. Nat'l Home Centers, 335 Ark. 356, 364-65,
981 S.W.2d 91, 96 (1998)).
262. Id. at 635, 80 S.W.3d at 351-52.
263. Id. at 633, 80 S.W.3d at 350.
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mental to the public welfare.2 6 It is not enough that the prohibited behavior
is generally considered offensive or immoral. 265 "Desire to harm a politi-
cally unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental inter-
est. 266
Reiterating that the sodomy statute prohibits certain acts between per-
sons of the same sex, while the same acts are legal for opposite-sex couples,
the court asked whether a rational legislative objective justified the distinc-
tion.267 If the public is not harmed when opposite-sex persons engage in
sodomy, the court reasoned, the prohibition of same or similar conduct be-
tween same-sex persons cannot be justified.268 The defendants had offered
no concrete evidence that a same-sex sodomy law is rationally related to a
legitimate government purpose. 269 The plaintiffs had met their burden of
proof that the statute was grounded in "illegitimate disapproval, biases and
stereotypes. "
270
The court concluded that the Arkansas legislature "cannot act, under
the cloak of police power or public morality, arbitrarily to invade personal
liberties of the individual citizen.,, 271 The statute could withstand neither a
272strict scrutiny review of its privacy limitations, nor a rational basis review
level of scrutiny of its restrictions on equal protection. 273 Thus, the court
declared Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-14-122 violative of civil liber-
ties guaranteed by the Arkansas Constitution.274
D. Concurrence
Justice Robert L. Brown agreed that the case was justiciable because
the state had labeled the plaintiffs criminals and held the sodomy statute
over their heads "like a sword of Damocles . . . ready to fall at any mo-
5,275ment. He questioned the purpose of retaining a statute that the defen-
dants claimed would not be enforced.276 The sodomy law, said Justice
264. Id. at 635, 80 S.W.3d at 351-52.
265. Picado, 349 Ark. at 635, 80 S.W.3d at 352.
266. Id., 80 S.W.3d at 352 (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996)); see
supra Part III.B.l.b.
267. Picado, 349 Ark. at 637, 80 S.W.3d at 353.
268. Id., 80 S.W.3d at 353.
269. Id. at 636, 80 S.W.3d at 352.
270. Id. at 634, 80 S.W.3d at 351.
271. Id. at 638, 80 S.W.3d at 353.
272. Id. at 632, 80 S.W.3d at 350.
273. Picado, 349 Ark. at 638, 80 S.W.3d at 353.
274. Id., 80 S.W.3d at 354.
275. Id. at 639, 80 S.W.3d at 354 (Brown, J., concurring).
276. Id., 80 S.W.3d at 354 (Brown, J., concurring).
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Brown, branded the plaintiffs "with a scarlet letter" and created a "no-lose
proposition" for the defendants and a "no-win situation" for the plaintiffs.277
Justice Brown also agreed that the sodomy statute violated equal pro-
tection and privacy rights.278 More fundamentally, he found the statute in-
consistent with the "bedrock principles of independence, freedom, happi-
ness, and security" guaranteed by the Arkansas Constitution.279 The sanctity
of home and bedroom, according to Justice Brown, is well-established in
Arkansas law and tradition.28° Pointing to an amicus brief filed in support of
the plaintiffs by local religious organizations,28' Justice Brown emphasized
that social values and attitudes change and the interpretation of constitu-
tional provisions rightly reflects those changes.282
E. Dissent
Justice Ray Thornton, with Chief Justice Arnold joining, dissented on
the grounds that the plaintiffs did not bring a justiciable case or controversy
to the court.283 Pointing to the constitutional separation of powers, Justice
Thornton asserted that judicial intervention in legislative activity is justified
only as a last resort and only in the context of a legitimate controversy be-
tween individuals.284 Because none of the plaintiffs had been prosecuted or
directly threatened with prosecution, Justice Thornton opined that the matter
should rightly be left to the legislative process. 285 He further noted that the
plaintiffs had failed to establish a direct link between the alleged collateral
harms, such as abusive police behavior, and Arkansas Code Annotated sec-
277. Id., 80 S.W.3d at 354 (Brown, J., concurring).
278. Id. at 640, 80 S.W.3d at 355 (Brown, J., concurring).
279. Picado, 349 Ark. at 638, 80 S.W.3d at 354 (Brown, J., concurring).
280. Id. at 639, 80 S.W.3d at 354 (Brown, J., concurring).
281. Brief of Amici Curiae, National Conference for Community Justice, Right Reverend
Larry E. Maze, Rabbi Eugene Levy, Reverend JoEllen Willis, Reverend Donna Roundtree,
More Light Presbyterians of Central Arkansas, and University of Arkansas law professors
Donald Judges, Cynthis E. Nance, Richard B. Atkinson, and Morton Gitelman in Support of
Appellee Elena Picado et al., Picado (No. 01-815).
282. Picado, 349 Ark. at 641, 80 S.W.3d at 356 (Brown, J., concurring).
283. Id. at 642, 80 S.W.3d at 356 (Thornton, J., dissenting).
284. Id. at 643, 80 S.W.3d at 357 (Thornton, J., dissenting). Justice Thornton laid out the
precedent conditions for declaratory relief as follows:
(1) There must exist a justiciable controversy; that is to say, a controversy in
which a claim of right is asserted against one who has an interest in contesting it;
(2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the
party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; in
other words, a legally protectable interest; and (4) the issue involved in the con-
troversy must be ripe for judicial determination.
Id. at 644, 80 S.W.3d at 357-58 (Thornton, J., dissenting).
285. Id. at 642, 80 S.W.3d at 356 (Thornton, J., dissenting).
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tion 5-14-122.286 In deciding the case, according to Justice Thornton, the
court had acted inappropriately as a "superlegislative body with an assumed
authority to correct mistakes that the court from time to time may believe
have been made by our General Assembly.,
287
V. SIGNIFICANCE
Because Picado stands out for its expansion of legally recognized
rights for a long-disfavored minority group, attorneys, legal scholars, and
potential litigants may wrongly pigeonhole the decision as one of interest
primarily to gays and lesbians. The greater significance of Picado is that it
firmly established the Arkansas Constitution as a guardian of individual
rights greater than those guaranteed under the United States Constitution.288
The court asserted that it has long "recognized due process as a living prin-
ciple, ''289 indicating a willingness to consider appropriate expansions of civil
rights under the state constitution. The decision will undoubtedly encourage
future plaintiffs to add state law claims in constitutional rights cases, hoping
that the Arkansas Supreme Court will apply a broader interpretation to their
rights than federal courts interpreting the United States Constitution.
This section will begin with a look at the implications of Arkansas's
participation in the new judicial federalism. It will then discuss the three
major Picado holdings, on justiciability, privacy, and equal protection
290
and their ramifications for the future of civil liberties in Arkansas. It will
also look at how the holding on equal protection creates a new source of
legal arguments for lesbians and gay men.
A. Invigorating the Arkansas Constitution
The Picado decision clearly established the Arkansas Supreme Court
as an active participant in the new judicial federalism. 29' Arkansas citizens,
advocacy groups, and attorneys can now look to the court as an earnest
guardian of civil liberties. In Griffin v. State,292 the court expressed its will-
ingness to go beyond federal guarantees in protecting individual rights in
the context of criminal search and seizure.293 The Picado decision indicates
286. Id. at 647, 80 S.W.3d at 359 (Thornton, J., dissenting).
287. Id., 80 S.W.3d at 360 (Thornton, J., dissenting).
288. Picado, 349 Ark. at 600, 80 S.W.3d at 332.
289. Id. at 632, 80 S.W.3d at 350.
290. Id. at 622, 632, 638, 80 S.W.3d at 343, 350, 353-54.
291. See id. at 600, 80 S.W.3d at 332.
292. 347 Ark. 788, 67 S.W.3d 582 (2002).
293. See id., 67 S.W.3d at 582.
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the court's willingness to go further.294 The language of the opinion ex-
presses a presumption that the court will not rely on the United States Con-
stitution.295 In its discussion of privacy, the court said:
[A1]though it is clear that no fundamental right to engage in homosexual
sodomy is protected by the United States Constitution, the textual and
structural differences between the Bill of Rights and our own Declara-
tion of Rights mandate that we explore whether such a right exists under
the Arkansas Constitution.
296
Further, the Picado court did not defer to the clear resolution of the
state legislature, but struck a statute the lawmakers had repeatedly refused
to repeal.297 The court noted that although acts passed by the state legisla-
ture are entitled to a presumption of correctness, they will be struck down
when there is "clear incompatibility between the act and the constitution."
298
The court also was undeterred by the political risk of finding in favor of an
unpopular minority group, one that has received mixed treatment at the
hands of the United States Supreme Court.299 It used the case to restate the
principle that the constitutional guarantee of equal protection serves to pro-
tect "minorities from discriminatory treatment at the hands of the majority.
Its purpose is not to protect traditional values and practices, but to call into
question such values and practices when they operate to burden disadvan-
taged minorities .... ,300 The Picado opinion left no doubt that the Arkansas
Supreme Court looks to the state constitution to protect the rights of all Ar-
kansas citizens.
B. Pushing the Justiciability Envelope
The Picado court evidenced a broad view toward justiciability by find-
ing the plaintiffs' fears of prosecution and collateral harms to be judicially
cognizable. °1 Similar decisions, where the court hears a challenge to a stat-
ute that enjoys widespread public support and under which nobody has been
prosecuted, are rare. 30 2 The Picado holding affirms the court's willingness
to protect disfavored minorities from oppressive legislation and acknowl-
294. See Picado, 349 Ark. at 600, 80 S.W.3d at 332.
295. Id. at 624, 80 S.W.3d at 345.
296. Id., 80 S.W.3d at 345.
297. Id. at 621, 80 S.W.3d at 342-43.
298. Id. at 623, 80 S.W.3d at 344.
299. See supra Part II.B. 1.
300. Picado, 349 Ark. at 633, 80 S.W.3d at 350 (quoting Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842
S.W.2d at 499 (Ky. 1992)).
301. See id. at 622, 80 S.W.3d at 343.
302. See supra note 215 and accompanying text (giving examples of constitutional chal-
lenges of statutes by plaintiffs who had not been prosecuted).
[Vol. 25
PRIVACY AND EQUAL PROTECTION
edges that an unenforced statute can have far-reaching and devastating ef-
fects.3 °3 Thus, the decision opens the door for future constitutional chal-
lenges grounded in fear of prosecution, stigmatization, and other collateral
harms. As societal attitudes evolve in areas of religion and morality, citizens
who are resistant to change may fight back with statutes like those at issue
in Epperson,304 Bennett,30 5 and Picado.316 While laws that affect individual
rights in such dramatic ways may be rare, the ability to challenge them is of
monumental importance to the groups affected.
C. Forging a New Right to Privacy
In Picado, the Arkansas Supreme Court held, for the first time, that
Arkansans have a fundamental right to privacy under their state constitu-
tion.30 7 Further, the court held that state privacy rights are broader than
guarantees under the Federal Constitution as interpreted by the United
States Supreme Court. 30 8 A state guarantee of privacy has significant legal
ramifications for both individuals and families.309
In the future Arkansas courts may look to the Picado decision in con-
sidering a multitude of contemporary matters involving the boundaries of an
individual's right to privacy. The right to abortion remains a hot political
issue that was inexorably linked to privacy rights in Roe v. Wade.3 1° Picado
could make Arkansas state court a more favorable forum for abortion-rights
proponents, especially if there is a federal curtailment of Roe v. Wade.
Privacy related issues faced by other state courts include the right to re-
fuse medical treatment,311 the constitutionality of traffic check-points in-
tended to deter drunk-driving,31 2 and the legality of police searching a sus-
pect's garbage for evidence. 313 As law enforcement technology advances,
303. See Picado, 349 Ark. at 622, 80 S.W.3d at 343.
304. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
305. Bennett v. NAACP, 236 Ark. 750, 370 S.W.2d 79 (1963).
306. 349 Ark. at 622, 80 S.W.3d at 343.
307. See id. at 632, 80 S.W.3d at 350.
308. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986); see also supra Part IlI.B. l.a.
309. See supra Part III.B. L.a.
310. 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
311. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278-79 (1990) (noting previous
United States Supreme Court decisions protecting the right to refuse medical treatment).
312. Sitz v. Dep't of State Police, 429 N.W.2d 180, 185 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988) (disallow-
ing a checkpoint program as violative of the Fourth Amendment).
313. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 37-38 (1988) (holding that it was not uncon-
stitutional for a police officer to request that a garbage collector give her the defendant's
trash); see also Stanley H. Friedelbaum, The Quest for Privacy: State Courts and an Elusive
Right, 65 ALB. L. REv. 945 (2002).
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fresh judicial challenges to search and seizure techniques will arise.3 14 The
war on terrorism has created numerous privacy concerns, including the pos-
sible curtailment of constitutional protections against unreasonable search
and seizure, monitoring of communications, and government access to per-
sonal information. 315 A fundamental right to privacy under the Arkansas
Constitution may be an important element in the resolution of these and
similar issues in state courts.
D. Establishing Equal Rights Protection for Gays and Lesbians
In Picado, the Arkansas Supreme Court held that gays and lesbians are
entitled to equal protection under the Arkansas Constitution as a separately
identifiable class. 3 16 The decision could change or clarify the legal status of
Arkansas homosexuals in several ways. Public employees, for example,
now have a claim for equal protection under the Arkansas Constitution if
they suffer discrimination based on sexual orientation. This right was previ-
ously established under the United States Constitution by the ruling in Ro-
mer.317 Arkansas public employees who suffer adverse employment actions
because they are gay or lesbian will now have recourse under both state and
federal law.
While Picado was pending, the American Civil Liberties Union of Ar-
kansas filed a lawsuit seeking to strike the policy of the Child Welfare
Agency Review Board prohibiting qualified lesbians and gay men from
serving as foster parents.3" 8 According to a statement by board member
Robin Woodruff at the time the policy was passed, the Arkansas sodomy
law was one of the rationalizations for this policy. 319 By striking the sodomy
statute, the Picado court removed that justification. And, gays and lesbians
now have a potent tool with which to fight the foster parent policy. For the
first time, the Arkansas Supreme Court has identified them as a "separate
314. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). In Kyllo, the United States
Supreme Court decided that the use of thermal imaging to detect "waste heat" emanating
from lights used in the production of marijuana was an unconstitutional intrusion on the right
to privacy. See id.
315. Whitehead & Aden, supra note 129, at 1101-03, 1131-32.
316. See Jegley v. Picado, 349 Ark. 600, 634, 80 S.W.3d 332, 351 (2002).
317. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); see also supra Part lI1.B.l.b (discussing
the Romer decision).
318. Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Challenges Arkansas Policy
Banning Gay and Lesbian Foster Parents (April 6, 1999) (on file with author).
319. Robin Woodruff, Remarks at the Meeting of the Child Welfare Agency Review
Board (Aug. 1998) (transcript on file with author); see also Picado, 349 Ark. at 600, 80
S.W.3d at 332.
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and identifiable class. '320 The Picado court left open the question of what
level of scrutiny will be applied to equal protection cases based on sexual
orientation. 321 If it is intermediate scrutiny, the Child Welfare Agency Re-
view Board will have to show that the policy serves important governmental
objectives and is substantially related to achievement of those objectives.322
At the very least, the policy will have to pass a rational basis review.
323
The Picado decision also will likely have an impact on child custody
cases. In the past sexual orientation and the sodomy law have been used
against lesbian and gay parents seeking custody of their children.324 Again,
Picado has removed both justifications-the status of sexual orientation and
the practice of sodomy. The holding calls into question two existing court of
appeals decisions on this issue, Thigpen v. Carpenter325 and Larson v. Lar-
son.3 26 Lesbian and gay parents will undoubtedly use the Picado holding
when seeking equal treatment in custody disputes.
State courts all over the country are dealing with constitutional issues
related to the "gayby boom," a dramatic increase in the number of children
being raised by same-sex parents.327 The American Bar Association esti-
mates that as many as ten million children may be in this situation.328 Lesbi-
ans and gays will invoke the equal protection guarantees of their state con-
stitutions to enforce their rights and compel state legislatures to recognize
the changing dynamics of what it means to be a "family" in the twenty-first
320. Picado, 349 Ark. at 634, 80 S.W.3d at 351. The significance of the class designation
is that homosexuals as a class can now be compared to similarly situated persons in a differ-
ent class, e.g. heterosexuals, for purposes of equal protection analysis. See supra Part
1Il.B. .b.
321. See supra Part llI.B.l.b.
322. Picado, 349 Ark. at 633, 80 S.W.3d at 351.
323. Id., 80 S.W.3d at 351.
324. See Larson v. Larson, 50 Ark. App. 158, 902 S.W.2d 254 (1995); Thigpen v. Car-
penter, 21 Ark. App. 194, 199, 730 S.W.2d 510, 513 (1987); see also supra Part 1II.B.3 and
notes 206-08 and accompanying text.
325. 21 Ark. App. at 194, 730 S.W.2d at 510.
326. 50 Ark. App. at 158, 902 S.W.2d at 254.
327. Melanie B. Jacobs, Micah Has One Mommy and One Legal Stranger: Adjudicating
Maternity for Nonbiological Lesbian Coparents, 50 BUFFALO L. REv. 341, 342 (2002). For
example, a formidable legal dilemma arises when a lesbian couple has a child together
through the use of artificial insemination and the non-biological mother attempts to establish
a legal parent-child relationship. Shannon Minter, Lesbian and Gay Parents and Their Chil-
dren, A.B.A. GEN. PRAC. SOLO & SMALL FIRM SEC. MAG., Oct./Nov. 2001, available at
http://www.abanet.org/genpractice/magazine/octnov200 1/minter.html.
328. Jacobs, supra note 327, at 199 n.9.
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century. 329 The Picado decision may be used to provide legal support for
these nontraditional families.
330
The Arkansas Supreme Court holding in Picado may affect gay rights
in a number of other areas. No longer burdened with the label of "criminal,"
gay men and lesbians as a class now enjoy at least some level of state con-
stitutional protection. Eventually, one can expect advocates to attempt to
build on Picado in areas like hate crimes statutes, domestic partner benefits,
adoption and parental rights, and perhaps even marriage or "civil unions. 33'
Arkansas gays and lesbians will begin to look to the state constitution in
their search for equal protection under the law.
The Picado holding may also help lesbians and gays who seek legisla-
tive support for equal rights. According to David Ivers, one of the attorneys
for the plaintiffs, "aside from custody issues, perhaps the biggest collateral
harm was that every time a bill came up at the legislature that would recog-
nize the rights of gays and lesbians, the existence of the sodomy statute was
used to defeat it." 332 Examples include failed attempts to include gays and
lesbians in existing employment discrimination laws and in a proposed hate
crime bill.333 The statute was also used by proponents in failed attempts to
support passage of laws singling out homosexuals for discrimination, such
as a prohibition on gay adoption.334
The Picado decision has implications far beyond its specific applica-
tion to gays and lesbians. Justice Imber's long, scholarly opinion invigo-
rated discussion of civil liberties, particularly in the areas of privacy and
equal protection.335 In addition, the Arkansas Supreme Court took a stand
against the use of majoritarian moral standards to oppress politically disad-
vantaged groups. 336 Individuals, advocacy groups, and civil rights attorneys
may long look to this opinion as a bellwether of expanded civil rights, not
just for lesbians and gays, but for all who come into court under the laws of
Arkansas.
Bonnie Johnson*
329. Interview with David Ivers, Partner, Mitchell, Blackstock, Barnes, Wagoner, Ivers
& Sneddon (November 4, 2002). David Ivers, Emily Sneddon, Suzanne Goldberg, Ruth E.
Harlow, Susan L. Sommer, and Gary Sullivan represented the Picado plaintiffs. Id.
330. Id.
331. American Civil Liberties Union, Lesbian & Gay Rights, at http://www.aclu.org/
issues/gay/hmgl.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2003).
332. Interview with Ivers, supra note 329.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. See Jegley v. Picado, 349 Ark. 600, 80 S.W.3d 332 (2002).
336. See id. at 633, 80 S.W.3d at 350.
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